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The practice of prenatal diagnos is raises a number of serious ethi cal dilemmas. I sha ll focus here o n
o ne of these : the selective abortion
of defective fetuses. Selective abortion is commonly recognized as the
ce ntral ethica l dilemma in prenata l
diagnosis, and it receives new urgency in light of the recen t deci sions on abortio n by the Uni ted
States Supreme Court.
T he questions being raised here
are first, wha t justi fications are of-
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fered for prenatal diagnosis and tributed to a second trend whic
selective abortion; and second, influences this discussion : a move
what are the implications of the ment toward a " qua lity of life
ethical reasoning embodied in ethic which, accord ing to an ed
these justifications? I shall argue toria l in California Medicin .
that the current and projected places relative rather than abs<
widescale practice of prenatal di ag- lute value on human life.2 Th
nosis and selecti ve abortion estab- " qua lity of life" ethic may be sec
lishes precedents which both vio- generally in the trend toward a•
late fundamental principles of cepting abortion and specifical
just ice and threaten the traditiona l in arguments that it is better n<
life-preserving orientation o f med- to be born than to be born U !
wa nted.
icine .
Thus prenatal diagnosis h.
It may be helpful first to set the arisen in a general climate <
entire discussion in the context of concern for " popula tion growt
two important trends in our chang- women's rights, the consequenc
ing social ethos. Both these trends of illegal abortions, the num b
have achieved sharp articulation of 'unwanted ' children and tl
during the time of development discriminatory aspects of curre
of prenatal diagnos is, and both abortion laws.":! It · is within tl
have influenced arguments made ge neral framework and its speci, ;
on behalf of prenata l diagnosis and a rticul ation in the recent det sio ns by the Supreme Court ti' t
selective abortion.
The first trend encompasses a the practice of prena tal di agno~ s
general awareness of " women's a nd selective abo rtion must c
rights" a nd specifically, a move- assessed.
Preliminary Observations
ment toward autonomy of women
Before considering the moral y
in the reproductive sphere. This
trend received significant articula- of selective abortion, some preli •tion in the Supreme Court deci- ina ry observatio ns are in ord r.
n
sion in Griswold v. Connecticut Prenata l diagnosis itself is
procedu e.
( 1966), in which a marital right information-gathering
to privacy in r eproducti ve matters C learly, the information general ·d
was decla red to be protected as a can be used in a variety of wa s,
constitutional right a nd its culmi- and not only as the basis for enation can be seen in the recent lective abortion. Indeed, prat ,idecl aration by the Supreme Court tioners stress the fact that m 1st
tha t " this right of privacy . . . is diagnoses reveal a normal fe us
broad e nough to encompass a and hence serve to reassure anxi1 us
woman's decision whether or not couples4 and on occasion to p event a scheduled abortion.~ M ··eto te rminate her pregnancy." 1
over,
a few disorders may be
C urrent concern for the effects
treated
prenatally or postnatally
of rapid populatio n growth and
on
the
basis
of a prenatal diag nothe scarcity of resources has con-

110

Linacre Quarterly

sis, 6 and it is hoped . tha t more
treatments will be a va ilable in the
future.' Thus prenatal diagnosis
is advocated not only to provide
for selective abortions, but because it . potentially brings these
other benefits as well. Nonetheless, a cursory examination reveals
the centrality of se lecti ve abortion
in the practice of prenatal diagnosis, and hence justifies a foc us on
this one issue.
To begin with, the importance of
the "reassurance" rationa le can be
tested by asking first, whether any
woman could have an amniocentesis just to make sure that the fe tu
she carries is normal, a nd second,
whether a woman could get amniocentesis if she had no inte ntion of
having an abortion in the event of
abnorma lity. The answer to both
these questions is " no ." First, not
all women are considered eligible
for amniocentesis, but o nl y those
in " high risk" or " moderate risk"
groups.K Second, even for those
women in high risk groups, amniocentesis will not be perfo rmed unless abortion is at least an option,!'
and some practitioners would even
say that the woman mus t be committed to an abortion before diagnosis will be performed . 111 The reason in both cases is simple: the
r!sks associated with the diagnostiC procedure are considered sufficiently great so as to preclude
the diagnosis in the absence of
genuine risk of defect a nd suffi cient benefit - the benefit of
reassurance alone does not outweigh the harms of the procedure.•• No matter how important
the reassuring function may be
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in ac tual practice, it d oes not constitute sufficient justification for
widescale prenatal diagnosis.
Similarl y, the a rgument that
prenatal diagnosis " saves lives"
by preventing abortions a lso depends on the accepta nce of selecti ve abortion : the interest here is
not in saving the lives of all fetuses
by preventing all a bortions, but
only in saving the lives of normal
fetuses by prevent ing th em from
being aborted. Thus the entire line
of reason ing depends on acceptance
of the abortion of defecti ve fetuses.
As for treatment, there are currently only a few disorders for
which treatments are avail able and
"at the present time, the emphasis
is placed on diagnosis of disorders
in wh ich there is no treatment."l 2
Moreover, even where treatment
is available, most practitioners
still allow the couple the choice
of abortion, and indeed suggest
that that is what most parents
would prefer. 1:3 Hence the avai lability of treatment does not rul e
out a bortion .
Developing Treatments
But even though treatment is not
a major possibility now, sure ly
prenatal diagnos is might be j ustified as a necessary means to gain
basic informa tion needed in order
to stimula te the
development
of new treatments . 14 Attracti ve
though this argument might at
first seem, however, there are several problems here.
First, if parents would indeed
choose a bortion over "any but
the most trivia l treatmen t, " • ~ it
is not clear th at th e impetus to
deve lop treatments will exist.
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(But even if future fetuses
might indeed benefit from information gained through present
diagnoses, there re ma ins a serious
question : is it justifiable to subject a fetus to risk in an e xperiment which carries no hope of
benefit to that fetus but only to
future fetuses? The lack of clear
legal a nd ethical guidelines regarding experimentation on the
unbo rn must not o bscure the fact
tha t this is a critical questio n.
Should the fetus be protected, fo r
example, by laws that govern experimentation on mino rs? The answer to this question is beyond
the scope of this essay ; but the
question must be recogni zed.)
Seco nd, whatever ho pe there
may be for future treatments, such
future possibilities do not in fact
form sufficient justification for the
performance of prenatal di agnosis
in the eyes of some practitioners.
Dancis states that any attempt previously to di agnose defects prior
to birth wou ld have met with the
response "why bother?" because
no inter vention was possible. ' " It
is " medical inter ventio n of some
sort" that justifies the use o f prenatal diagnosis. And, as . we have
seen, intervention " of some sort"
usuall y means aborti on.
It is obvious, then, that whatever other benefits may be clai med
fo r prenata l diagnosis, for the
present and for the foreseeable
future, its "justifying" or " rea l"
purpose is to provide fo r selective
abortio n . Ethi cally, then, the crux
of the matter is wheth er or not
selective abortion of defective fetuses is justifiable.
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Selective abo rtio n is not, o l
course, a new issue. While it ha~
rarely been a central issue in the
"abo rtion debate ," it has received
at least sporadic attention follow
ing rubella epidemics and tht
tha lidomide scare. A "eugenit
abortion" clause has appeared i1
almost every pro posed model cod,
for abortion reform, and a nu m
ber o f states have included sucl
a c lause in revised abortio n statute
within the last few years.t7 Hence
the issue itself is not new.
What is new in selective ab01
tion following prenatal diagnos1
is th e certa inty of the di agnos i•
Previously, a decision for selecti \
o r " eugenic" abortio n had to c
based o n statistical probability <
" risk" figures; now, an "actu
diagnosis" can be made.' K Tht .
prenatal diagnosis is hailed as
great advance fo r " taking the. gar
ble o ut" o f pregnancy and gene t ;
counselingYJ
The advent o f pren atal di agnm ~
the refore focuses the question
selective aborti o n in a new at J
dra matic way : for the first ti n
the problem of selective abort i n
arises no t bec ause of accident •r
mis hap, but because of the del! •er ate intervention of medical te< 1no logy. For the fi rst time, select e
aborti on is not an occasio nal a td
regrettable act, but the plan r ·d
outcome of delibe rate progra ol S
of medical practice.
Nonetheless, most of the eth i al
issues ra ised by prenatal diagno, is
and se lecti ve abortion are iss ues
th a t have been implicit o r expltc it
in the "abortio n debate" over the
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past few years. Now th is debate
has raged so long and hard and
covered so much territo ry that one
is well advised to exercise caution
when e ntering fhe fray. Moreover,
the recent decisions by the Supreme
Court suggest that the wisest course
might be to assume that the legal
resolution of the issue also resolves
the moral dilemmas.
Arguments Examined
However, I suggest that previous
debate and present legal fr amework notwithstanding, there may
yet be a little room fo r clarificatio n of the issues and mo ra l decision-making with regard to selective
abortion . Therefore, I s hall exa mine the a rguments offered as j ustification for selecti ve aborti on and
place those arguments within a
logical framework which will he lp
to asce rtain what is rea ll y at stake
in this practice.
The m atter is co mplicated at th e
outset by the fact that few practitioners present explicit a rguments
to justify selective abortio n. Most
advocates si mply refer to the legality of abortion or its acceptance
within a significant reference group
-:- for example, " therapeutic aborti on may be offered where it is
legal,"20 "most people would probably prefer a bo rti on,"2 t " most obstetricians would regard abortion
as acceptable,"22 and so o n. Indeed, some practitio ners specifica lly
e~~mpt themselves from responsib_thty for maki ng the eth ical deciSio n, on grounds that it is their
j?b to lay the e mpirica l foundations on which legal, ethi ca l, and
politica l decisions wi ll be made
by others. ~:1

l\lay, 1973

o netheless, alongside specific
disclaimers and vague re fere nces
to decision-making groups there
emerges fro m the discussio n a constellatio n of claims for selective
abortio n.
First, selecti ve abortio n is justified o n grounds that it procures
benefits fo r individual famili es :
it protects them from the financia l
and e motio na l strains associated
with bearing and rearing a c hild
with a genetic disease24 and it
minimizes the risks involved in
pregna ncy. Special pleas a re made
o n behalf of families with a previous history of devastating defect,
who may be afraid to " take a
chance" with another pregna ncy
unless they can have prenata l
diagnosis.t.>
In addition, there is consider able
em ph as is o n the rights of wo men
and couples and especia lly on
freedo m of choice and auto no my
in the reproductive s phere . Amniocentesis is seen as a technique
which " o pens doors"- that is,
which expands the o ptio ns available to women and the ir spouses,
thus enabl ing them to exercise
freedom of choice. 21; It is a cardinal rul e in the practice of prenata l
diagnosis that the " ultimate" decisio n fo r both di agnosis a nd aborti o n is to be made by the coupleP
O ne practitioner has even suggested that parents have a righ t
to healthy children.tK
First Rationale
T hus the fi rst r atio na le give n
for selecti ve a bo rtio n . is that of the
benefits accruing to indi vidual women and their fam ilies. As this ratio na le begins to shade over into
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qu estions of women's rights and
reproductive freedom, it t a kes o n
the c ha racte r of the first social
trend e nume ra ted above, ass imilating the trend a nd contributing
to it.
Alo ngside th is concern for the
pregnant woma n a nd he r fa mily,
the re e m e rges a nother concern :
an inte rest in the impact of genetic
disease o n society as a whole, and
in the public health as pects of prenatal diagnosis. Justification for
diagnosis and a bortio n is therefore a lso derived from benefits to
society gained through wide -scale
screening programs.
In th e first place, genetic ists contend tha t screening progra m s co uld
have a e uge nic effect in e liminating d e lete rio us genes fro m the
gene poo 1.<!9 In the second place,
practitio ne rs argue that screening
and a bortio n would significa ntl y
reduce fin a ncial burde ns to the
sta te, since fewer childre n wou ld
be born needing costly medical o r
instituti o n a l care. Elabo rate cost benefi t economic analyses have
been m a d e for seve ral disorde rs .:ICI
Conce rn fo r protection of society
a t la rge is thus the second reason
give n as justifica tio n for selective
a borti o n .
Just as a rguments rega rding
bene fits to women "shad ed ove r"
into a rguments a b out women's
ri gh ts and procreative f reedom,
so he re the a rgu ments regardin g
be nefits to soc iet y shade over in to
a la rge r conce rn , which may be
e ncom p assed by the phrase " quality o f life ." Prenatal di agnosis a nd
se lective abortion a re justified because they function to prese rve a

114

norm of genetic health which
a pa rt of the " quality of life.":i t
The concern for a standard o
ge ne t ic health may be seen to op
era te, first, in the assumptio n tha
pre na ta l diagnos is and selecti v
ab o rti on function as " preventi v
medicine." This assumpti on ha
been made explicit on several oc
casio ns .:12 Moreover, it is implic
in the u se of phrases such as " r(
duce the incide nce of disease,
"elimina te di sease," or " prever
the birth o f " rath er than '.'abort
As " preventive medicine," prenat.
di agnos is a nd selecti ve ab ortio
combin e to preserve the no rm <
genetic health which is a pa rt <
the qua lity of life .
Second, concern. · fo r the nor
of genetic healt h and the qua li
of life have been r a ised explici t
by sever al advocates. Qua lity · r"
life ques tio ns a re m ost often link( I
to questi ons of quantity, and it ~
here th a t the conce rn for ge ne t
no rma lcy becomes most apparer
Prenata l diagnos is is seen as
mea ns o f quality control in J
qua ntity-l imited syste m . O n t c
level of th e indi vidua l famil y, t e
qu a ntity-qua lity link is seen cle < ·ly in sta te ments to the effect t l 1t
w ith increasing pressure to li n it
fa mily size, pa rents will not W <.J 1t
to risk a ny d epa rture from the l1l r mal in the ir offspring.:r:r lnded,
unde r pressures of quantity, q u 1ity co ntro l becomes a right : · if
the s ize of our fa milies must JC
limited , surely we a re e ntitled to
children who a r e healthy rat her
th a n defective. " :14
Social Needs
The qua lity pro blem is seen not
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only o n the individua l level, however, but a lso as a res ponse to societal needs. Thus one practitio ne r
. claims: " The world no lo nger needs
all the individuals we a re capa ble
of bringing into it," a nd a rgues
for selective abortion on these
grounds. 3s Prenatal di agnosis be comes a tool to e n sure th a t "both
the quantity and quality of the
human race a re kept within reasonable limits.":l6 Maintaining the
norm of genetic health thus justifies prenata l diagnosis a nd selective a bortion because m a intenance
of the no rm is a necessary step in
ensuring quality of life in a time
of concern for populatio n growth.
The concern he re is well su mmarized by one practitio n e r re flecting
on the work of severa l pio neers in
the fi~ld:
Dr. Gerbie a nd his. assoc iates have
helped us take still a no the r step
down the long road wh ich we must
foll ow if we are going to improve
the q uality of h u man existence
while searching f o r better methods
of controlling populatio n densit y.:l1

Finally, the norm of g~netic
health may a lso be seen in th e
argument that the fetus h as a right
to be "well-born. ":lH The argu ment here is that there is a funda menta l right to be born " with no r mal body and mind" and th at if
this right is no t to b e fulfill ed ,
then it is better not to be born a t
a11.:19
. In sum, the impo rtance of gene thealth is ta ken as a given, which
carries its own justifica tio n . It is
~nly necessary to know th a t there
IS a choice betwee n he alth a nd dis ease: _the obvious choice on the
part of a ll parties- fa mily, society,
IC
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a nd the indi vidual concerned will be for health .40
These, then , a re the j u stificati ons
for selective aborti on: benefits to
the woman a nd fam ily a nd to society as a who le, b o th in terms of
sp ecific a nd measurabl e emotional
a nd economic facto rs a nd in terms
of the mainte nance or restoratio n
o f the norm of genetic health.

Ill
We can now ask how th ese justificat io ns fit into the context of the
"abortio n deba te," what other assumptions are necessary to explica te th e m, a nd what it means to
fo llow out the ir implicatio ns logica ll y.
Severa l of the justifications offered for selective abortio n followin g pre natal di ag nosis a re simila r
to specific a rgument s u sed to esta blish other ca te go ri es of " indic a tio ns for abortio n. "
The concern to prot ect the woma n a nd fam ily e m o tiona lly a nd fina nc ia lly is not a n ew concern
in the a borti o n d e bate, nor is it
unique to se lective (or euge ni c)
a bo rtio n; rather, it is re miniscent
o f the " psychiatric" and "socioecono mic" indications for aborti o n . Thus if these a rguments a re
u sed to justify se lective abort io n,
the justi fica tio n becomes simila r
to tha t u sed for the p sychiatric a nd
socio-economi c indications. And
indeed, it appears to b e the practice in some places to requi re a
psyc hia tric examinatio n and justify the abortion as " therapeutic"
o n these grounds. 4 '
However, some a d vocates rej ect
the " psychiatric indications" a rgument: one practitioner calls it
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" circuitous" and " ridiculous" to
require psychiatric examination
of the woman following di agnosis
of defect in the fetus. 42 They
want the presence of defect alone
to be sufficient justification for
aborti on. This argument, therefor e, parallels the traditiona l a rguments for a separate category
of " eugenic" abortion which has
validity independently of other
criteria.
The assertion that there should
be an independent category of
abo rtio n for "eugenic" indica ti ons,
in which the very presence of defect j ustifies abortion, is a logical outcome of reasoning o n the
basis of a no rm of genetic health.
Thus a psychiatrist commentin g
o n prenatal di agnosis notes th at
" for some people, aborti o n of a
defecti ve fetus is less unsavory
than abortion of a presumably
no rmal fetus," and he explains this
fact on the basis th at it is " in line
with our medical orientation that
makes the extirpation of disease a
no ble act." ~ :l
If arguments for selective abortion appear at first glance to coincide with va rio us arguments for
" ind ications" for abortio n, however, there is also evide nce of
affinities between arguments used
for selective abortion and the soca lled " abo rtio n on demand" a rguments.44 Here, the basic cla im
is that the woman's freed o m is
an overriding value which dictates
the availability of abortio n " witho ut reason" (t hat is, without public
o r legislative consensus o n the
reason proffered) . Women may
thus choose to have a c hild or
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not, to have a defective child
not, as they please.
C learly, then, it is necessary
examine th e arguments for sell
ti ve abortio n both within the ge
eral conte xt of "abortion on c
mand" a nd within the mo re s peci
context of specia l claims made
the case of defect. It will also
necessary to suggest ways in whi
the recent Supreme Court d ecis i
impinges on the various argume.
and sets th e context for any futt
actio n .

·
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I shall begin by examining Vt y
briefly th e question of " abort i n
on demand ." (Before do ing
),
however , a brief note is necess: ·y
regarding the relation of abort: n
on d e mand to the mo re speciali, ·d
arguments for abortion in selec ·d
categories. The histo ry of the ab r·
tio n controversy makes it o bvi < JS
th at it is possible to argue for elected categori es of justifiable ab •r·
tio n without a lso condoning ab r·
tio n o n demand . I wou ld ar, Je
that it is also logically possi blc to
condone abortion on demand w hout necessarily condoning eugc tic
abortion . Logically, o ne can ar uc
that a wom an has the right to le·
termine whether or not she is 1 re·
pared to acce pt a pregna ncy, mt
th at ha ving m ade th at determr 1a·
tio n the particular status of ,he
fetus sho uld be irrelevant.)
T he a b ortio n on demand ar gu·
ment gives primacy to the freecom
of choice of the woman. Howe ' er,
it must a lso deal with the fact , hat
freedom of choice of one hu man
being does no t usuall y ex tend to
the po int of killing another hu nwn
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being; that is, there is · a presumption that a human being has a
right to life and that my freedom
does not normall y extend to the
point where it de prives ano ther
of his right to li fe . Thus if the
fetus is considered to be a human
being, the woman would not no rmally have the right to kill th at
human being. T o counter this difficulty, advocates of abortion on
demand usually take either of
two positions: First, they argue
that the fetus is not a human being - or not " fully" human and hence has no right to li fe.
Second, they a rgu e that altho ugh
the fetus is human a nd hence has
a right to life, there is something
in the unique relationship of the
WQman and fetus th at destroys the
"normal" prohibition against ki lling.
Most advocates have taken the
first approach: they assert that the
fetus is not (fully) huma n. A rgu ments of this sort range from those
that assert that the fetus is a me re
"tissue" or part of the woma n's
body45 to those that recogni ze
the fetus as a " develo ping" o r
"potential"
human being, but
argue that full humanity is not
present until a specified time.
Must Set Time
The difficulty with this view is
that advocates must then determine a time at which the developing embryo/fetus/neonate is considered to be (fully) human - six
weeks? three mo nths? at viability?
one year after birth ? That is, they
are caught in a line-drawing pro blem: When does the individual acquire full human sta tus? The desig-

May, 197 3

nation of a time of attainment of
full humanity a lways presupposes
the c ho ice of criteria accord ing to
which huma nity is determined brain function ? lung capacity?
personality? speech?
Now these criteria for deter mining that one has reached full humanity always have to do with functi onal capacity and personal develo pment. Hence it is always possi ble
to ask whe ther there would be
others besides fetuses who wou ld,
logica ll y speak ing, be subj ect to
the determination that they are not
" full y human" and hence not protectab le under the law.
For example, geneticist J osh ua
Leder berg argues that the momen t
of conceptio n should not be conside red " as the start of human life";
rath er, he sugges ts, " an operationa lly useful po int of divergence o f
the developing organism would
be a t approxima tely the first year
of life, " ·W on the basis of develo pment of la nguage and cogniti ve
interacti on with others. However,
the es tablishment of this time point
on these criteria would obviously
allow for the destructio n of the
newborn c hild up to one year of
age . Logically speak ing, Lederberg's criteri a would allow for
infa nticide. At this poi nt, Lederberg draws back from accepting
the logical conclusions of his
sta ndards and refuses to discuss
infanticide, on g rounds that our
emo tio na l in volvement with infa nts is sufficient to establi sh "a
prag ma tica ll y useful dividing line."
He then implies that the " tastes"
o r emoti o na l involvement of " th e
majority" determines o ne's status
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as a human being to be given full
protection under the law: " To discuss the fetus du ring prenata l life
as if he we re a human be ing is ·
merely to reflect the emotional
invo lvement of that observer, accordin g to a set of tastes no t no w
shared by the majority." One must
ask, then, whether persons o r
groups who do not meet the standard of emotional involve men t
would be considered less tha n
fully human and no t protectable
- for example, the convicted criminal o r any outcast group: 17 Once
again, Lederberg draws back from
the logical conclusions of his own
argument and suggests that the
criterion of emo tional involvement
"sho uld not be co nfused with a ny
objective biological standard by
which we can set up principles of
socia l o rder."
Lederberg's search for an " o bjecti ve biological s tandard" to get
him o ut of the pro blems he e ncounters with his own criteri a illustrates as well as anything the
inherent difficulty in this bas ic
line of approach : any biological
point that is chosen \':ill be chosen
o n the basis of other crite ria, and
these c riteria . are a ll too o ften the
results of our very huma n weaknesses. (Do we choose uspo ntaneous lung functi on" as the dete rmining criteri on of humanness because we really think it is a decis ive criterion, or rather because
we would like to be able to destroy the fetus prior to viability?)
Are we willing to accept the conseque nces of our ·c hoices - what
about those who must exist with
the help of an iron lung?

11 8

Human Standards
In sho rt, there is no "objecti
biologica l standard," but o nly ve '
rea l human standards. To be su
som e choices make more ser
than o thers: Fletcher has suggest~
for exa mple, that in order to ~
consiste nt with ou r increasing
entation toward bra in activity
defining the end of human li
we sho uld also define the beg
ning of human life in terms ,f
bra in activi ty. 4 8 Certa inly, ·· c< ~ ~
sistency is a desirable trait in b< h
logical think ing and huml\n in t
action ; indeed, this suggest n
f!1akes considerab le sense. Hl :ever, s ince the presence of br n
activity in the fet us has been m 1sured as earl y as six weeks, c· 1siderably before a mniocentes is ' ,n
be performed, F letc her 's criter m
wo uld preclude prenata l di agn1 is
and selective abortio n.
In view of the difficulties J f
drawing a line on the devcl pmental continuum, several ad acates of aborti o n o n demand h ve
preferred to take th e second ro ,e:
they argue for abortion o n he
basis of the special relatiom tip
betwee n the woma n a nd the f us
which is deemed to nu lli fy .he
prohibition aga inst killing.
he
most intriguing expos ition of an
a rgument alo ng thi s line is t ha of
Judith J arvis Thomson.4 !1
Tho mson proposes that we accept, fo r the sake of argu n ; nt,
the claim that the fetus is hum<••l.:,u
T he question then is, under ' hat
circumstances may we justifLtbly
kill a human being? Suppose, -,ays
Thomson, that you wa ke one m Jrning strapped to a famous un..:onscious violinist who needs your
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kidneys to survive; " Is it morally
incumbent on you to accede to
this situation? Does the right to
. life of the violinist require this
heroic a n<;! self-sacrificing act on
the part of another person? T homson concludes that · it does not:
" nobody is morally required to
make large sacrifices, o f health,
of all other interests and concerns,
of all o ther duties and co mmitments, for nine years, o r even fo r
nine mo nths, in order to keep another person a li ve." In essence,
T homson's argument rests upon
the mora l right of the woman to
remove herself from the violinist
- or from the fetus. While separating woman and fetus in fa.ct
secures the death of the fetus,
Thomson is not arguing that a
woman has a right to secure the
death of the fetus, but only to
remove herself. Presuma bly, if
pre-natal adoption o r an artificial
womb were ava ilab le, e ither of
the options could be used to preserve the fetus while freeing the
woman.
This a rgument is more th an intriguing; it has a certa in force in
its logic. Nonetheless, I think it
also admits of some difficulties.
Thomson clai ms tha t the woman
has a right to remove herself fro m
the fetus; the fact that the fe tus
then dies is perhaps unfortunate,
but not central to the mo ra l issue.
Perhaps a different scena rio will
help elucidate the issues.
If one gr ants, as T ho mson does
th
. at the fetus is human, then the'
~ssue is whether o ne human beIng may remove herself from another when that other is depend-
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ent upon her body functions fo r
survival. Surely the closest parallel
to pregnancy, then, is the case of
s ia mese twins, in which separatio n
would cause the death of one twin.
The mo ral question then is : could
an adult siamese twin choose to
" remove" herself from her twin,
knowing full well that the twin
would die, but claiming that her
freedom was the more important
value? (The medi cal practice of
involuntar ily se parating siamese
twins at birth, with the resultant
death of one, does no t change the
moral argument regarding the
righ ts of adult siamese twins.) If
anything, it could be argued that
we sho uld fee l more sympathy
toward the plig ht of the siamese
twin than toward the pregnant
woman - the twin's predicamen t
is both involunta ry and lifelong.
Yet I wonder if we would be wi lling to accept the twin's argument;
would we not be inclined to consider the " removal" of one adult
twin with the resultant death o f
the other to be mu rder, or wrongful killing? It is not clear to me
that we are read y to argue logically that o ne human being may
"remove" himself from a nother
when that r emoval causes the
other's death.
Other Examples
Indeed, to bring the scenario a
little "closer to home" for most
of us, let us suppose that a man
is responsible fo r the continued
care o f his e lde rly a nd dependent
father, who will die if no one is
in attendance at his bedside. Surely this man is m o rally free to leave
his father 's bed s ide i.f there is
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someone else t o sit and watch over
his fath er. But w hat if there is no
one else? Is he then morally free
to walk off, leaving his father to
die? O r, suppose a young child
needs medication every few hours
to survive; is not that child's mother
mo ra lly (and perha ps legally) culpable if she " removes" herself from
the child and it dies?
In short, Tho mso n's distinctio n
between removing o neself fro m
a no ther and securing the death of
ano ther becomes problematic when
we consider a variety of cases. In
cases where our nurturing functi o n could be served by others, we
are perhaps wi lling to argue that
we have a right to re move ourselves provided that we have secured someone else to carry on
the nurturing. But in cases where
there is no o ne else to carry o n
tha t function - i.e., in pregnancy
today, and in the case of sia mese
twins - I suggest that a view th at
reall y respects the full humanity
of the other wi ll not so re adily
a llow us to argue tha t we may
" re move ourselves," causing thereby the death of the othe r. ( Hence,
I suspect that Tho mson .has no t
reall y ta ken the human status of
th e fetus serious ly, that she has
not really overcome her ow n predisposi ti on " th at the fetus is no t
a person fro m the moment of
conceptio n.")
To accept Tho mson's argument
mea ns to accept what it logicall y
enta ils: the right of any human being to remove himself fro m one
who is dependent o n him, even if
th at removal results in the o ther's
d eath - the elde rl y father , th e
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child in need of medicatio n, an
the adult siamese .twin. Once agai1
the argument allows for th e de
structio n of othe r human being•
If we are not willing to acceJ
these consequences, the n we mu·
reject the premises.

v

Thus far, I have dealt with tl
general qu estion of abortion u1
der the rubric "aborti on o n de
mand," locating two basic wa.
of approaching this issue and su
gesting that there are probl~ ms
the extens io n of logic in either
these approaches. It has not be• 1
my intenti o n to resolve the iss
of w hether or no t the fetus is c
titled to protection of its li fe, t
only to illustrate the difficul ll '
encountered in a position that c
nies protection to the fetus.
However , the questi o n of seh
tive a borti o n introduces a new c
ment to the discussion . As Dan ·I
Calla han suggests, with select 1 e
abo rti on we are dealing not w h
the proble m of an unwanted p n ?nancy, but with the problem of n
unwa nted ch ild:'' A logical e x rcise will illustrate what is at sta c:
Suppose that an art ificial wo tb
were ava i Iab le. Then , if the p rpose of abortion is to free 1e
wo man from an unwanted pr gnancy, logically the fetus would be
placed in the artificial womb. Wo dd
a defective fetus also be thus r ·ese rved, o r would its ge ne tic st<..tUS
somehow " make a diffe rence" in
how it is treated?
Since the purpose of seleCti ve
aborti o n is no t only to pro tect the
wo ma n but also to protect soc1dY
and preser ve the 11o rm of ge nd ic
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health, it seems logical to assume fetuses be allowed? To date, prethat simply moving the fetus from natal diagnosis has missed the
one location to another wou ld no t presence of twins, but practitio n·be sufficient to fulfi ll the purposes ers agree that parents would be
of selective a bortion. To th e ex- allowed the choice.52 Thus even
tent that selective abortion is o ri~ a known normal fe tus could be
ented toward ma intenance of the aborted in o rder to abort an abnorm of genetic health or the no rma l fe tus.
Fina lly, since there is a lways a
"quality of life," it requires the
destruction of those who do not possibility of error in diagnosis,
we can ask whether advocates premeet this norm.
Now this illustration of the ar- fer a false positive which wou ld
tificial womb is, of course, a hypo- result in the abortion of a norma l
thetical situatio n a t ·prese nt. None- fe tus, or a false negative which
theless, there are indicati o ns in th e wou ld result in the birth of a n
current practice that demonstrate affected child. Practitioners disthe centrality of des tructio n of de- agree here. One states flatl y tha t
the loss of th e "rare norma l pregfective fetuses in this practice.
nancy" would be "an undefendaDetermining Sex
First, prenatal di agnosis is used ble catastro phe." 53 Another, howto determine th e sex of the fetus ever, suggests that it is a " mo re
in cases at risk for sex-linked dis- critica l" error if a negative di agorders such as hemophilia. In nosis is given and th e ch ild is
such cases, the male fe tus which born defecti ve than if a positive
is aborted has a 50 percent ch ance diagnosis results in abortion of a
of being normal. Thus half of the presumed defective fet us and the
fetuses which are aborted in sex- defect is no t confirmed upo n exlinked cases will in fact be no rma l; amination of the abortus.5 -t
It seems clear that the practice
this destruction of norma l fetuses
is allowed in order to e nsure de- of prenatal diagnosis estab lishes
a distinction between the no rmal
structio n of defecti ve fetuses .
Now in the case of sex-linked and the defective fetus, and aldisorders, one does no t know wheth- lows for differe ntial treatment of
er a particular fe tus is de fecti ve o r the fe tus o n th is basis. As one
normal ; hence the abortio n is d one concern ed practitioner put it: "We
on the supposition that the fetus are faced with problems of assignmight be defective. A more com- ing va lues to individuals with given
plicated case, therefore, would be genetic characteristics and designthat of a di agnosis of twins wh ich ing programs directed against
revealed o ne normal twin and o ne them." ~ .;
defective twin. In such a case, in
Serious Problems
order to " get rid of" the defecti ve
What a re the implications o f
fetus, it would be necessary to de- ado pting this kind of reasoning
stroy . the normal fetus as well. -of treating fetu ses diffe rentia lWould this destruction of no rma l ly acco rding to their gene tic con-
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stitution? I suggest that there are
a number of serious problems in
estab lishing this kind of precedent,
and I shall deal briefly with several
of these, illustrating where appropriate with difficulties encountered
already in the practice of prenata l
diagnosis. 5 6
The first problem is th at of determini ng the categories of fetuses
considered destructible. Where is
the line to be drawn on the determination of what constitutes sufficient " qua lity of life" to ena ble
the fetus to live?
This problem will be encountered in two forms. In the first
for m, it has to do with the severity
of genetic defect. The normative
use of prenatal diagnosis is for
severe, untreatable disorders (e.g.,
Tay-Sachs,
Down's
syndrome).
However, even present techniques
will diagnose less severe disorders
(e.g., XO), and with expanding
technology such incidents may be
anticipated more frequently. Will
abortion be allowed fo r less severe genetic disorders, or for disorders where treatment is available?
Already this problem is being encountered in · the practice of prenatal diagnosis, a nd advocates appear to be divided in their responses.
While some would maintain that
" if there is an effective intrauterine treatment, then, of course,
it should be applied," 57 probably
most would agree that abortion in
the case of a treata ble disorder
" remains a parental decision based
on the informed counse l of their
physicia n." 5 K
Second, the determina tion of
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destructible fetuses may be e
tended from clear genetic cat
gories to categories of social d
sirability or usefulness. As Ka
says, "Once the principle, ' Defe
tives should not be born,' is e
tablished, grounds other than cyt
logical and biochemical may ve
well be sought."5 9 The beginnin
of this trend may already be se 1
in the treatment of fetuses wi 1
XYY chromosomes, where· t
" prognosis" for the child is pr
Iematic primarily because- of t
possibility of socia lly undesiral
behavior. If XYY fetuses are
be aborted, then what about fetw s
of women living in undesirab le c
cumsta nces - for example, wo
en on welfare? Will "quality ~ f
life" come to be d etermined m< e
on the basis of socia l useful n s
than clear genetic disorder? C e
practitiOner has a lready ~rgt d
for prenatal diagnosis on groUJ Is
that " the world no longer ne• Is
a ll the individuals we a re capa le
of bringing into it - especi : ly
those who are unable to camp te
and a n unhappy burden to < hers."60 Surely such criteria as
"ability to compete" extend '1e
range of destructible fetuses ar
beyond the severe ly genetic lly
handica pped .
Indeed, I would stress the tct
tha t all categories chosen dep nd
on some social criteria - e en
those that are most closely 11ed
to genetic anomaly. For exam .1le,
most practitioners consider Dov n's
syndrome to be a " clear-cut" case
calling for abortio n.H1 Certa111 ly
the genetic compo ne nt - a trisomy
G - is clear enough ; and this
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genetic component is re lated to edly starved to death because its
certain clinical symptoms such as parents refused surgery necessary
mental retardation. But to deter- to save its life.H4 It seemed clear
mine therefore that fetuses with tha t had the child been normal,
trisomy G . should be aborted is to the surgery would have been pe rmake a social judgment about the formed.
place of retarded individuals in
Indeed, some physicians now
society. It is possible to judge dis- argue explicitly for a different
ability or deviation from a norm standard of treatment for newmedically, but to determine that born children with Down's synthis deviation constitutes a signif- drome. One has said : " Parents of
icant handicap is to make a socia l mongoloids have the legal (and I
judgment. H2
believe the moral) responsibility
Drawing a Line
of determining if their child .
The first point, then, is th at it should live or die, " and he sugis extremely difficult to "draw a gests that this decision may be
line" ·w ith regard to the categories seen as a "second chance" fo r
of fetuses which will be consid- abortion.1;5
ered destructible, since all deterThus it seems that infanticide
mination of such categories in- is si mply the logical extension of
cludes a social compone nt a nd prenatal diagnosis. Indeed, one
will be subject to the vagaries of practitiOner
comments:
"Early
~oci al opinion. The phrase "qual- abortion based on prenatal diagIty of life" defines a continuum nosis can be viewed as the modfrom the severely disabled through ern counterpa rt o f infanticide based
the socially undesirable to the on congenita l defect. "H6 This, then,
"optimal" child. Where on this is the second seri ous problem imcontinuum will the line be drawn? plicit in the reasoning behind preThe second " line drawing" prob- natal diagnosis a nd selecti ve aborlem has to do with the time contin- tion.
uum. As one practitioner asks:
These firs t two pro blems have
" Are we going to be faced with been
line-drawing
problems d~mands to do away with a child problems of determining the cateWith 2 1-trisomy whose mother was gories of destructible fetuses, and
only 34 years old during her preg- the time of destructi on. The third
nancy and therefore was den ied problem is of a somewhat differt~e benefits of prenatal di agno - ent nature. It involves the locus
s IS.?1"3 Do not the same argume nts
of decision -making and the possible
that j ustify abortion of a fi ve month conflict between ''women's rights"
old fetus a lso justify infanticide?
on the one hand and the "quality
That this question is not J·ust of li fe" on the other. I suggest that
ranc•.·f~I is borne out by a recently as increasing value is assigned to
pubh~Ized case at Johns Hopkins the " preventi ve" function of preHospita l in which a newborn c hild natal diagnosis a nd selective aborwith Down's syndrome was re port- tion, the concern to eliminate deI
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fectives and preserve the " quality
of life" may logicall y be extended
to deprive women and families of
decision-maki ng power.

.... ...

....

Quality of Life
To be sure, at present advocates
assume that the concept of "quality
of life" embraces both the familial
a nd the social aspects of prenatal
diagnosis, and that there will be a
concurrence of benefits to individua ls and to society. They assume
that if women are given freedom
of choice, they will choose to abo rt
defective fetuses and hence their
choices will serve the best interests of society as well.
However, it is obvious that the
interests of individual families and
of society at large will not always
coincide - even in the decision
to abort the defective fetus. For
example, it has been calculated
that if all male fetuses at risk for
hemophilia we re aborted and
" replaced " by female children,
the result would be a dramatic
increase in the number of female
carriers of hemophi lia - a 50
percent increase in the gene frequency in each generationY 7 Hence,
decisio ns made to benefit individual fa milies ·might have a dysgenic
effect o n society as a whole.
On the o ther hand, at times
where it would be beneficial financially to society for a fetus to be
aborted , the woman o r family
might prefer not to abort. Would
the woman's freedo m of choice
be restricted . here o n gro unds of
benefiting society o r preserving
the genetic health? One concerned
practitione r has raised the problem by suggesting that the unce r-
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tainties
could result in an acc entuation of
the conflict in our society between
personal c hoice and governmental
control, which could possibl y come
in the form of selected programs of
compulsory screening and mandato ry abortion fo r some conditions
that are deemed socially lntolerable.68

Indeed, co mpulsory abortion has
ready been proposed. t>9
In a situatio n where the . fe
has no inherent rights and gene
health becomes an overriding '
ue , compulsory amniocentesis <
abortion is a logical outcome,
one practitioner rightly antici pa

s
c
1d
ts
s:

The decision to terminate the li f
of a fetus has traditionally bee
denied even to the couple at r i s~
but the more widespread legal at
ceptance of aboriio n, the grow in
awareness of the impending cris
inherent in the populati o n expl (
sion, a nd increased concern for tt
social cost of genetic disease lea
me to think that atte mpts to ·legi
late eugenic progra ms may not 1
so untimel y or even so far in tl
future as many of us have expecte
Individua ls in a society which
willing to allow eve n normal fetus •
to be aborted simply at the requ( t
of the parents are not likely to :
very to lerant of a know n abnorrr I
fetus.' 0

To be sure, sever al practitic tcrs
ha ve expressed their alarm an. rejection of compulsory prog ams
a t the same time as they rais the
questio n. But the point is tha the
toward
compu sory
movement
aborti o n of defecti ve fetuses is a
logical outcome of . e levating the
no rm of ge netic health to ewerride any rig hts of the fetus.
Further, once a principle ha!> been
estab lis hed that the genetically unequal may be treated unequall y in
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accordance with the ir genetic potential, other forms of unequal
treatment will be enco mpassed by
this principle. One of the first a reas
to be affected by the application
of this principle will be that of
procreation: the suggestion has
already been made th at reproduction be regulated in accordance with
genetic inheritance - that " qu ality
control" have a built-in "qua lity
control" component. 71 A practitioner has even claimed that " most
of the women screened should not
have been pregna nt in the first
place. All women who would have
genetically high-risk pregnancies
should be offered steriliza tion o r
an effective method of contraception.72 Thus the way is opened
up. for other kinds of restrictive
programs as we ll.

sis, a nd tha t ma ny practitioners are
relucta nt to give up entirely their
traditio nal decisio n-mak ing functio n. Thus, for example, one suggests
th at a mniocentesis should not be
do ne in cases of LSD ingestion
because the physician would be
obligated to provide fo r an abo rtio n if chromosome breaks are
found ;75 here, the physician retains his power of making a medical judgment. Another practitio ner has suggested that the use o f
prenatal diagnosis simply to de termine the sex of the fetus constitutes
an " abuse" of prenata l diagnosis
a nd that information o n the sex
of th e fetus should be withheld
" unless it is crucial for management of the case."76 Prenatal diagnosis, in this view, is not to be
a tool fo r the "frivolo us" uses of
women ; ye t if abortion is a womImpact on Medicine
an's r ight, then it must be performed no matter how "coldFinally, the acceptance of selec- blooded and contrived" it seems
tive abortion and its principle of to the phys ician.
unequal treatment of unequa ls will
On the other hand, if selective
have profound implications for the abortion is justified no t as a wompractice of med icine . On the o ne a n's right but as a means of ma inhand, if selective abortion is a wom- taining the norm of genetic health
an's right, then the physician is and pro moting "quality of life,"
obligated to provide for it _73 As the physician is in danger of bewith "abortion on demand," the coming a technician for society.
role of the physicia n is thus radi- Theologian Helmut Thielicke decally changed: " For the first time cla res that the doctor becomes a n
· · · doctors will be expected to "engineer, a technici an doing
do _an operation simply because the manipulations for a productive
patient asks that it be done. "74 The society ." 77 Thus Friedmann sugphysician, then, becomes a tech- gests th at " it is not difficult to
nici_an performing according to the imagine th e emergence of pressures
destres of others.
to set sta ndards for desirability in
_There is evidence alread y that ge netica ll y determined huma n charthis dilemma is being encountered acteristics" and we must ask whose
in the practice of prenatal diagno- sta nda rds they might be. 71!
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Further, the practice of prena d
Thus in the long run, this pracdiagnosis
adds something to t 1S
tice threatens the basic orientation
equatio
n:
the
deliberate institut n
of medicine: as geneticist Jerome
of
medical
programs
designed o
Lejeune puts it, to "capitulate in the
selective
treatment
of hu n n
fos
ter
face of our ignorance and propose
li
fe.
Friedmann
captures
the tr h
to eliminate those we cannot help"
well
in
his
haunting
statement
t 1t
is to reverse the entire course of
medicine. Not only do the princiPrenatal genetic diagnosis seeme<
at first no different fro m most othe
ples established here have serious
new diagnostic methods. Now w•
imp lications for human rights in
see that we are faced with pro b
society, but they also challenge the
lems of assigning values to individ
foundations of medical practice.
ua ls a nd designing programs d1
VI
rected agai nst them. so
Now clearly, many of these same
For all these reasons, I su l 1it
problems have arisen in the general
that
the current practice of pren .al
debate on abortion, and are not
diagnosis
and selective abor n
unique to selective abortion. In a
threatens
basic
huma n rights nd
sense, one could say that selective
I
urge
practitioners
to recons ler
abortion gives a prismatic view
the
implementation
of
wide-s ale
of the implications of abortio n in
programs
of
diagnosis
and
abor1 >n.
general - of the problems of exPrenatal
diagnosis
is
indeed
a ~ry
tension of logic, the threats to huexciting
new
technology
with
n my
man rights and to medical practice.
potentially
beneficial
uses
in
roBoth a bortion in general a nd selecviding
"therapy"
for
the
aff\
t
ted
tive abortion in particula r involve
the assignment of relative rather fetus and help to anxious par .1ts.
than absoiute value to human life These justifiable uses should not
on the basis of some social criteria; be overshadowed by allowi n it
hence both establish precedents to become strictly an exercis in
which violate fundamental princi- selective abortion .
p.les of justice as we have underViolate Equality
stood those principles .in Western
Even
more
tha n abortion 0 1 desociety.
mand,
it
seems
to me, selc tive
Nonetheless, if the basic logic
abortion
e
mbodies
principle of
of selective abortion does not difunequal
treatment
which
vi Jlate
fer from that of abortion in general,
the
fundamental
moral
and
ega!
it is focused and reinforced here in
equality
of
all
human
being
.
In
a way which makes its implications
the
long
run,
this
violation
of
funmore striking and perhaps more
threaten ing. As Kass suggests, pre- damental rights · of equal treatment
cisely because the quality of the is a more serious threat to the '\ :tualfetus is at stake in the decision for ity of life" of all of us than the
selective abortion, this decision birth of numerous children with
undermines the fundamental moral defects will ever be. I am hearte ned by the seriousness with which
equality of all human beings.79
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this matter has been taken i'n general both by parents a nd by physicians; nonetheless, it is a dangerous move to aid parents by eliminating their· children. We must beware of the implications of moving
to a "quality of life" ethic in which
persons are judged according to
their social utility and hence "some
are more equal than others."
But perhaps it will be objected
that in view of the rece nt Supreme
Court decisions on abortion, physicians really have no choice : Does
not the woman now have a right
to an abortion, and if so, does the
medical practtttoner have any
choice but to offer prenatal di agnosis and selective a bortion?
Admittedly, the Supreme Court's
decisions are ambiguous. The Court
declares that the " right of privacy"
established in the Constitution is
"broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy."Bt At
the same time, however, the Court
also maintains that " the abortion
decision" is "inherently, and primarily, a medical decision," and
at all points it appears to give the
decision-making power to the
physician: " The abortion decision
and its effectuation must be left to
the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician. " 82
Thus it is not clear that physicians
must comply with the demands of
the woman ; there appears to be
room for " medical judgment" in all
cases, and especially in cases involving late abortion. Minimally,
physicians can choose to make a
true "medical judgment" regarding
the woman's "life and health" in
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each case, and not simply to allow
the very presence of defect to be
considered su fficient justificatio n
for abortion without further consideration of the "full setting of the
case."83
Finally, it seems to me that all
of us, physicians and lay persons
alike, have a responsibility to women and families to provide the emotional and fina ncial support needed
to enable families to care for children born with defects; although
I discourage widescale prena tal
diagnosis and selective abortion
because of the serious threats to
basic freedoms involved in this
practice, I do not think the matter
is settled morally by rejecting abortion. The birth of a child with a
defect can indeed be a shattering experience for a family; it is
the responsibility of all of us to
ensure that families are provided
with adequate resources. Ironically,
as I write this, federal funds for
many supportive programs are being curtailed ; this we must not allow to ha ppen.
If indeed the strength of a people
can be measured by their attitude
toward the weak, the defenseless,
and the outcast, the n selective abortion points to the weaknesses in our
society and in ourselves. It seems
appropriate, therefore, to close with
a word of warning offered by Ralph
Potter:
When a fetus is aborted no one asks
for who m the bell tolls. No bell is
tolled. But do not feel indifferent
a nd secure. The fetus symbolizes
you and me and o ur tenuous hold
upon a future here at the mercy of
our fellow men. 84

(References available on request.)
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